Problems Lurking in Ikeda Cabinet’s“China Policy" vis-a-vis The Republic of China by Shaw K.E.
251 
Problems Lurking in Ikeda Cabinet’s“China Policy” 
vis-a-vis The Republic of China 
by K. E. Shaw 
Max Weber once田idthat achievement in knowledge hes in raising 
questions. This tells profound truth, and Justifies the attempt made 
in th:s short article to point out s。meh町etoforeoverlo。｝《edbut 
import町1tproblems hidmg at the very bottom 。fJapan's 
Policy", with po田iblesolutions to them kept mtact. 
The study of Sino Japanese relations of the pre目前 stageis to a 
large extent determined by ideology. But with ideology one either 
fals into criminations and recriminations, or commits the mistake 
of arbitrariness. No objective皿ddependable conclusion can be obtamed 
in such case, hence never Cdn achievement be made This article 問
、.vrittenm a manner that it be as much objective as possible, by 
free ch01ce of mate 口alat hand四 dthrough iudgement according to 
conscience of learning, at the expense of personal preferences and 
national bias. Consequently, the terms“Republic of China，出1d“Red
Chm a”are used in this article for convenience’s sake, and are not 
to be misunderstood as having田 yspecial implications, ideolog1cal 
or otherwise. 
Traditional 
has been criticized by m阻 ya Jap阻田eas a pa詰ive“wa1t-and-see 
policy at a st百1dstill."Such attack becomes stronger百奇ds廿ongerday 
after day, due chiefly to I《edaCabinet's somewhat more waddling 
attitude on the “China Problemヘm comparison with the attiturle of 
the former Kishi Cabinet Since Ikeda came into power, domestic 
opm10n urging a change of Japan's policy toward China, to the effect 
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that Japan sh叩 Idrecognize Red China as early as possible, so as not 
to“lose吐1ebus", has brought for Japanese Government headache 
in poht1cal and economic spheres. Especially, the unfortunate situation 
-of semi-severance of relat10ns between Japan and the Repubhc of Chma, 
which 1s the r田ultof the Chou Hung-chmg Asylum Case (October 
1963 January 1964〕followedby the what may be des町ibedas“De 
Gaulle Typhoon" of French “re-establishment”of diplomatic relations 
with Red China (J祖国ry27, 1964〕， givesroom to Japanese specialists 
in law and in politics and ex-professional diplomats ta confirm such 
-opm10n which, in turn, is transformed mto some kmd of pressure, 
or rather mducement, for Japan to a仕emptre C。nsideringits 
Policy", in part at least. 
However, the Ikeda Cabinet is not free to do so. And this because 
of three rea回ns:the too unstable balance of-power system existing 
within the rulmg Liberal-Democratic Party, which is one of the chief 
causes of weak leadership of this Cabinet, the potential but clear 
spht in opinion on the problem among the people at large ; and the 
色町田sityfor Japan加 cooperatewith USA m the matt町.One more 
thing, untold before and hence target of this article, must be added 
there exists a vital fact which belongs to common-sense but which 
is discarded by al who urge such policy-change between Japan and 
the Republic of China, due to the Peace Treaty (1952〕thereexist 
special juridical relations, in contradistinction to general Juridical 
relatio田 amongother States, which destructive aspect"' of effects 
must not be under estimated in pohtical determmat1on of Japan’s 
national interests, hence the existence of the Republic of China 
is not to be ignored, mtentionally or otherwise. Thus, the Ikeda 
-Cabinet’s“'Chma Policy" 1s bound to be nailed down. 
The above picture was given a VIVld shape in the policy trends of 
Japan vis-a-vis those of the Republic of China in the Chou Case 
.above ref町red;and the potential 1ssu田 appearedafter French recogn-
1tion of Red China. The centre of the picture 1s the complete 
イ1) This is the kernel of this article, se S即位onV below. 
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distrust on the part of the Repubhc of Chinese Government toward 
廿1eIkeda Cabmet."' The Chou Case and, w1出 theimpacts of French 
recognition of Red Chma in the sh~dow the actions and react10ns 
betwe.en Japan and the Republic of Chma in that case, are therefore 
unprecedented in postwar Smo・Japanese relatiom as well as highly 
instructive for knowing Japan’s pohcy toward China. 
I The Chou B:ung ching Asylum Case-F冶cts'"
According to daily四por包 onthe newspap町sand to other sources, 
the following is a summary of fac包 ofthe present case 
In Sept即 1ber1963, a group (The Oil-Squeezing-Machine Technique 
Observat10n Delegation) was sent from Red China to Japan. On Octa-
ber 7, immediately before this group was going to leave J句an, its 
interpreter, Chou Hung-chmg, defected from the hotel. He went to 
the Soviet Embassy in T依yo, requ白 tingf町 politicalasylum (1t 
was repcrted that he did so by mistake of the taxi-driver, because at 
the beginning he had intended to go旬 theChinese Embassy). 
The Soviet Embas町 refusedChou’s requ白 t,and Chou w出 handed
肝官旬 Japanesepolice on October 8. Later, he was transferred加
the Immigration Office, and was恒 aminedfor his illegal stay (over-
stay as from the day he defect疋d〕
In this period, Chou's desired place to s匝yin future was said to 
be・ first, Japan ; second, Soviet Russia, and third, Japan a哩ain."'
On Ocむober16 (mormng〕， Chouexpr缶詰dhis m七回t10n加 go加
(2〕 Onthis p凶nt,s田’M叩’sTide’（1〕ー “TheChma Problem and Ikeda 
Diplomac品”in“Sekai”（TheWorld), No 219, March I'S田， 196ιpp.89-94 
{3 ) For facts, the readers are referred to“Five Riddles surroundmg Mr. 
Ch叩 Hung-chingぺin“Asahi Weekly", Ja凶 ary24 issue, 1964 ; and “The 
Kernel of the Chou Hung-chmg Caseぺin“Asahi JournalヘJanuary26 issue, 
1964 For excel!ent criti田 fromviewpoint of Japanese Law, se Edo, 
“What the Ch凹 Hmg-ching Case suggestsヘm“Sekai",•bid., pp 73 80, 
especially, pp.77 et seq ; for Japan’s court decision on refugee cases after 
the war, v. Oda, "Preced阻 tsconcemmg‘Exile’in Japan", in “Jud st”， 
No.283, Cct. !, 1963, pp.61-7. 
(4) Edo, op. cit, p.7ιThe日 isdoubt on this p凶nt,and we will dispose 
of it later in Section II below. 
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Taiwan (Repubhc of Chma〕.He signed a paper to this effect before 
the immigration official and the First Secretary of the Chinese 
Embassy m Tokyo. In the afternoon of the same day, after bemg 
permitted to meet with left-wing lawyer, he changed his will verbally: 
加 stayin Jap四．
On October 23, after domestic legal procedures, Chou was given 
the Government decision: deportation. On October 24, he changed 
his will agam to go back to China Mainland. It was clear that 
during these days he was persuaded by leftists, apparently with Red 
Chma behind them 
On October 26, Chou was served with the Deportation Order, 
and the destination was Red Chma. 
In Japanese domestic legal procedures, this case was thus settled. 
However, there are doubts on the matt町： whetherChou’s real inten 
tion must be determined according to his“first will”or to his “final 
willヘandwhich 1s his“first will.”In other words, unlike the case 
where a man makes wills before death, whether in our specific回目
changes of will on the part of a pohtical refugee can, as a matt可
of law, dominate the dec1s10n of the State requested asy!Umー incase 
of aff1rmat1ve (1) whether the fact that Chou was permitted to meet 
leftists who naturally controlled his “free willヘhasanythmg to do 
with law; in田seof negative〔2)whether a will exp四国edma 
written form旬k田 pr配edenceover later changed wills. Here (2) is 
al田 relatedto another point (3) whether the decision of depoト
tat10n by the Japanese Immigrat10n Office is the standard for determ-
ining Chou’s will as to“where to stay”. '" 
The Republic of China protested, chiefly based on doubt (1〕
stated above. Japan’S Foreign Mm1stry was reported to have advised 
the Ministry of Justice to delay g四世ngChou the Leave Port Perm-
i田ionso as to cocl down the Republic of Chma. On the other hand, 
Ono, Vice President of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, went 
( 5 ) This is important as to which ts Chou’s“final will", le田lysp回king,
se mfra note 6. 
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tn the Republic of China for relieving the latter’s distrust toward 
Japan. Atmosphere became better, but aboul the Chou Case the 
s町10じSsituation remained the same 
According to Japan’s Immigration Regulations, in the pr田entcase, 
without permission from the Mimster of Justice Chou cnuld not 
leave Jaran From early November, Chou, again advised by leftists, 
でefusedto take food, as a form of protesting the delay in issuing 
such Permission. To support this i;rotest, left-wing Chinese Overseas 
in Tokyo, e司uallywith instructions from Red China, made demons・ 
trat10n against the Ministry of Justice, and threatened to apply to 
Court for a Writ of Habe•s Corpus. 
From that kind of protest, Chou became weak The Japanese 
Government, taking into cnnsiderat10n fur也erprobable pre田uresfrom 
left-wing force, released Chou provisionally on November 7, and 
transferred him to the Japan Red Cross Hospital. Th町eChou was 
being surrounded by leftists. Against this, the Republic of China 
protested once more. 
The Japanese Government then got anxious to find out a better 
form of settlement. But time was needed. It therefore extended the 
time limit of Chou's Provisional Release (on December 7 and Decem 
ber 20), so as to make legally possible further withholding of廿1e
Leave Port Permission. 
Since the attitude of the Republic of China seemed to be as hard 
as before, and since it would give way to Socialist Party to pre田
the Cabinet hard al:out such delay (and perhaps for fe町 thatpart of 
public opinion might one step forward question the “Chma Puhcy” 
which had been maintained for years), to avoid serious political 
rnsues, hence pnlitical responsibilities on the part of the Cabmet, 
the Japanese Government, on December 21, sent Mr Atomiya, Chief 
of Asian Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, to世1eRepublic of China 
for the purpose of “persiading”the latter. The Republic of Chma, 
however, took this as a consultation visit, and insisted to have Chou 
sent to Taiwan according to his“free will.”Before his departure from 
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Taipei, Atomiya expressed that he would consult his Government as 
to the last measure to take on the由民 Thismeant that up to that 
very moment the Japanese Government had so far not determined 
what m回 surewas to be taken, which in turn confirmed the consul-
tative nature of his trip. But this was a mutual mistake On the 
next day, the Japanese Government carried out the “ultimate identi-
ficatlon of Chou' s will”， and made fmal decision to the effect that 
Chou should be permitted to leave for China Mainland accordmg 
to his “fmal will”．助
On December 31, Japanese Foreign Ministry made a statement on 
the Chou Case The next day, January 1, 1964, Chou was issued 
Permiss10n旬 leave.
Such m田S世田 madethe Government of the Republic of Chma 
recall its painful experi町＼0白 vis-ii-visJapan in the old days, perhaps 
as far back as the Konoe Cabinet of 1938, immediately before the 
Sino-Japanese W町， wherethe phrase“not to talk with the Chinese 
Nationalist Government" became words m fashion,'" m the cont白Et 
of predicted change of the 
m future. It therefore protested on January 3, by withdrawing al 
important members of its embassy in Tokyo，目、dmade a statement 
denouncing Japan’s such “unfriendly”measur白
Meanwhile, al newspapers m the Republic of China, and some m 
Hong Kong and other Southeast Asian ooun廿ies,in their editorials 
named the m白sureof Japanese Government as“pro Communist 
murder”，“tricky”，“cheating”and “ambitious”， by referring to the 
Manchuria Incident and other “hateful happenings" before the Seロond
1市oridWar. 
On January 8, the Republic of China was reported七ohave decided 
to sever diplomatic relations with Jap田， byrequ田tingPh1hppmes 
(6〕 Thisrelates to the point as to whether the decision of deportation 
by the Japan田eImmigration Office (on October 26) w踊 thestandard for 
determmi昭 whichwas the“fmal will" of Chou, see supra note 5 (reference, 
Immigration Regulations, Article 53〕．
{7〕 Togawa,Showa Diplomatic History, 1962, p.167. 
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to repr白 entits mter恒也 inJapan. On the same day, to cool down 
the Gov町nmentof the Repubhc of Chma, Japanese Government 
considered to requ田tformer Prime Minister Yoshida旬 Taipeito 
・discuss fundamental problems between the two countries唱団 asto 
.strengthen their mutual relat10ns. Taipei reacted with a“welcome”． 
On January 9, Chou left Japan for Red China. For Japan this case 
.came to an end. On the田 meday, the Republic of China protested 
with a statement full of angry wordings. 
Two days later, the Republic of Chma suspended i包 government
purchases from Japan. A few hours later, Japanese Government 
<letermined not to sent Yoshida to the Republic of China because “it 
is not the right time." 
On January 14, a group of Chmese student attacked the Japanese 
Embassy in Taipei. Japan protested. 
Before and after this attack, among Chinese people on Taiwan and 
those overs国為田mekmd of anti・ Japanese feelmg w＇田 spreadmgout 
Police authorities of the Republic of China s紅白）gthenedprotection 
of Japanese nat10nals there, with a view to avoidmg violence done 
to them. 
Thus the relations between the two countries c田neto the worst 
pomt in their post・w.町 mtercourse,and have remamed semi-severed 
•Since January 3. '" 
JI. Background of世田 ChouCase 
{ 8) It was repor匝don Feb. 8 and 9, that at the request of prime Mini-
ster Jl.eda, Yoshida would visit the Republic of China for the purpose, 
mter alia, of recovering and strengthening仕iendshipbetween the two 
回un甘i苗.With the burden of the new situation given rise by French 
recognition of Red China, the Republic of Chma is bound to compromlSe, 
but will of C山田ecarry out more positive diplomacy toward Japan It 
is therefore neceesary for it to send to Japan veteran diplomats, instead 
of sending semi-diploma也 asit did before, so far as it d由江田， asit 
must desire, to carry out active diplomacy toward Japan, m the very 
near future when it feels such semi-sever回目 ofrelations with Japan 
undesirable 
258 
B白1d白 thatwhich was given at the beg111ning of this article, 
something, chiefly political in nat町民 lyingin the shadow of this. 
case must not be lost sight of. Withouもtheunderstanding of such 
“facts behind the facts”， one is apt to observe that the Japanese 
Government was mistaken in not returning Chou to the Republic of 
Chma, or that the Republic of China was purely emotional in its. 
r白 ct10nswith reasons unknown. In such case, no correct trends of 
policy can be discovered. As a matter of fact, the unfortunate result 
of semi-severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries 
may properly be said to have derived from misunderstandings between 
the two Governments they overlooked each other’s real intent10ns 
in the situation 
To begin with, the then rumoured French recognition of Red Chma 
was the dec1s1ve point behind the screen This gave impacts to both 
countで1es.
Such rumour brought Japanese public opinion to support the pres-
sure from left wing on the Government for early recogn1t10n of Red 
China The Government was reported to tend to reconsider its“Chm a 
Policy”. It was clear that, similar to prime Mimster Ikeda’s“low 
posture”defense of the “prudentiahsmヘthiswas only some kind of 
pretense tantamount旬 politicaland social self-defense as against the 
Progressive Camp within Japan, seeing that there was, and stil 
i3, no hope for reahzallon of such “reconsideration”. Nevertheless,. 
such report sounded unpl白 santto the Republic of China which did 
not fully understand the real intention of the Ikeda Cabmet. As a 
matter of fact, implied in such news report• th町ewas at least pcs 
sibihty that with this chance Japan might get closer to Red China. 
And to the Republic of China this was interpreted to be something 
more than it really meant or 抑制blywould mean ・↑hat Japan was 
threatemng with the diplomatic arms of “two Chmas”policy. This 
not only is directly opi:osed to the fundamental policy line of the 
Republic of China, but al田 hurtsits feeling. that Japan treated il 
with contempt 
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This is no mere speculation. Before the Chou Case occurred, there 
had already been anger and suspic10n on the paでtof the Republic 
・of China toward Japan, due pnnc1pally to the fact that Japan had 
been getting too close to Red Chma through trade as well as other sorts 
of intercourse. And the concrete facts are (1) late in August 1963, 
Japanese Government approved export of vinylon plant to Red Chma 
on the basis of deferred payments，〔2〕onSeptember 17 of他e
田meye町‘ PrimeMinister Ikeda, in 血 mterv1ewwith foreign 
correspondents Cfro:n USA), when askeヨaboutpossibility of success 
regardmg Republic of Chma’s counter-attack agamst Red China, 
gave neg抗ivereply with seemingly scoffing remarks ；〔3〕Ikeda,
in his trips to Southeast Asia‘excluded the Republic of China from 
his itineraries. There are too many examples to be cited. Even 
・during the Chou Case, expr田町田 bythe Japanese Government 
田moyedthe Republic of China to a high extent.＂》
Thus, the Chou Case is only a fuze of, nョy,rather an unexpected 
spark on, potential explosive The very fact that Chou was member 
of a“delegation”sent from Red China to Japan, itself tells every-
thmg廿ue:the Republic of China is disgusted at Japan's trade with 
Red China, which aてnountsto“assisting the ene田yof the Free 
World’＇， and at Japan’s getting close to Red China in any other 
form, which m the long run will possibly lead to realization of 
the “two Chmas”theory most hated by the Republic of China ; 
and there is suspicion on the part of the Republic of China toward 
Prime Mimster Ikeda for his doubtful attitude of the past ye町S,
perhaps going back as long as the time when he was his party’s 
( 9) For instance, Prime Mmister Ikeda, in his New Year Greeting tJ the 
Japanese people and in his New Year Interview with Japanese corres-
pondents on what he would do for Japan, touched the“China Problem" 
by saying that “that Japan fels close to Red China is a matter of cou四e”
（“The Mainichi Shimbun，＇’ January 1, 1964), and that“trade with Red 
China will be increase1 by geometrical progress10n ; this may not 
please the Republic of China, but it is Japan’s busine＂”（’ιThe Tokyo 
Shim bun，＇’ January 1, 1964) , and some other gov町nmentheads exp同盟ed
the view that Taiwan’s legal status was undetermined, etc. 
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Secretary-General. 
On the dispa田Iof the Chou Case in particular, there were, besides' 
the then scheduled French recogmtion of Red China, somethmg morn 
behmd the diplomatic war between the two countries 
So far as Japan was concerned, leftist force was, and st山崎 toa
strong to bring troubles of highly political nature to the Ikeda 
Cabinet, in case the Government determined to send Chou to the 
Republic of Chma. Espec1ally, the So口ahstParty, to avoid making 
Red Chma angry, was pressing hard on the Ikeda Cabinet in the 
Diet，田 asto impede further attempt<J by the Government to try 
relieving. the田辺町ofthe Republic of China. Even within the ruling 
Liberal-Democratic Party, Prime Minister Ikeda was in face of the 
fa rce of pro Red-China Lobby. With the hope of a“long-term 
回 bmet",Ikeda must prevent troubl田， bothinside and outside of 
his F町ty.For him, the fewer troubles, the better; and if troubles 
be inevitable, he must choose the least troublesome to fight. It is 
probable, on the other hand, that he, being a realistic person, 
田mewhattended to give weight to Red Chma over the Republic 
οf China, though many of his cabinet membe：四 mightnot share his. 
view. One more point ・theJapanese Government was m fe町 that
should it send Chou to the Republic of China or let .him stay in 
Jap皿， duringthe Tokyo Olympic Games to be held in October 
1964, this onuld become somethmg encouragmg representative 
athletes from Commumst coun仕1es,in which国間 1tmight have to・
face more serious problems and this might, consequently, spoil 
Japan’s national efforts for that Games which has important bearing 
on Japan’s national pnde and international status. 
So far as the Republic of China was concerned, the delivery of 
Chou to Taiwan would not only m白nthat it won a battle in the 
diplomatic field as against Red China, but also make a crack bet ween 
Japan and Red Chma, seeing that such delivery would naturally 
push Red Chma to adopt negative attitude toward trade or other 
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intercourse with Japan.＇＂》 Allth田eto the Republic of China had 
much to do with its international status and domestic (including 
China Mainland) pr白 tige,＜山 and白 peciallym白nttoo much to it, 
at a time when the international environment be国立古田 bad,as a 
result of the scheduled recogmtion of Red Chma by France. In this 
regard, two psychologi回lfacts must be taken into account m addition. 
(1) Hatred toward Japan du口ngthe Sino・ Japanese War had not 
totally disappeared as among government officials of the Repubhc 
of China ; and 〔2)Since the Peace Treaty(l952〕 betweenthe two 
countries their economic relation had come so close to each other, 
that Japan became the biggest buyer, which m田ns,m turn, that 
the Republic of China to a large extent depended on Japan，田 f町
as national economy was concerned, and therefore, the Chou Case 
was made use of by the Republic of China to realize the desire of 
shaking o百sucheconomic dependency."" 
With the above background in mind, both the disposal of the Chou 
Case by Japan and the reactions by the Republic of China see立lto 
be pohtically rat10nal However, Juridi田Uy,they are both erred 
III. The Real Nature of世田 ChouCase一世田 Juridic温IAspect 
Purifying the background, and we discover that the international 
Juridical issues of the Chou Case口seto the surface. It is v町y
curious that in both countries not a smgle comment on世uscase, 
scholarly or oth町wise,has discussed it as a case of int町田tional
law in the proper sense, or even mentioned i也 internationallegal 
aspect. They treated everything connecting with the “Chma Problem" 
(10) This refe!' to the “Nagasaki Flag Incident" of 1958, see infra note 31. 
(11) See infra Sectton II, on“constructive personal jurisdiction”of the 
Republic of China over people on China Mainland. 
(12) More are reserved for later discussions of poli可 trends.For de凶 lson 
such background, there are to many publications. Two of the b田tseem 
to be. Shimura，“Explodmg Point at the Chou Hung-ching Case”，阻“Sekai
Shuho”（“The World We出ly”）, January 28 lSsue, 1964, pp 14 et se午，
and Fuji，“Impeaching Japan’s’Benefit at the Expense of Righteousness’九
in ibid., p 20 f. 
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as poht1田lor moral issue, as if there were no internat10nal j町idical
norms regulating the matter. 
In truth, according to the facts stated above, the Chou Case, being 
a回目 claimedto be one of political asylum (refugee problem in 
the broad sense〕， isa typical case of international law. This古川田l
point being ignored, no wonder the results became so unfortunate. 
From beginnmg to end, it is interestmg to see that the a田町ー
tions of both coun廿ieswere the same but were meanwhile uncom 
promising They were the same, because both resorted to“hum田 ity”，
they were uncompromising, because they were parallel-while Japan 
took th胞団seas one to be determined by her domestic laws, the 
Republic of Chma, as one by international law. 
Thus唱 thecentral point is whether international law, or muni・ 
cipal law, must prevail, if humanity c四 notbe plural. This, needless 
to say, is a question of mternational law 
The Republic of China, on the one hand. contended that this was 
a日記 ofpolitical asylum, matter of universal human right旬 flee
oppression, hence international law should be applied,'"' and也atthe 
matter should be determined by Chou’s first will ; Japan, on the 
other hand, asserteヨthatthis was a case of over-stay, hence the 
Immigration Regulations was the law on the matter (human right 
to determme one’s residence according旬 one’sfinal will〕Thetwo 
r副1directly against each other: “first will" vs.“final will”． 
Considermg the facts given above, that Chou at the very 
beginning asked for political asylu'11 raises no doubt. The question 
is, therefore, three fold. First, which one of Chou’s wills, which 
contents are one m contradiction to the other, should prevail? In 
(13) According to Japane'e Constitution〔Preambleand Article 98), general 
international law and treaties to which Japan is a party, shall be respected 
by Japan. This m回目 thatsuch international laws take precedence over 
domestic laws, the Constitution being excepted Cf. Yokota, International 
Law, vol I, 1955, pp. 88-89, Takano, Constitution and Treaty. 1960, p 209. 
There 1s no serious question as to which of these two laws was to take 
pmedenc怠 intheir applicat10n to the Chou Case. 
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other words, whether it wos proper for Japan to recognize Chou’s“fmal 
will”（to return to Red China, hence excluding possibility of“poht1田 l
asylum＇’）， as against his“original will”（to request for politi回l
asylum〕.Secondly, whether Japan was under some mternational obhga-
ti on m handling this回目. Here, as the sine qua non, it must be 
asked whether there existed mternational iundi回lnorm〔ornorms) 
on“political asylum" in general Thirdly, if the second question be ans-
wered in the affirmative, then, whether there was a norm applicable 
to the Chou Case m particuhr, if回， whatwould be the results ' 
〔1)Which one of Chou’s wills should prevail ? 
On this point there is no rule in the law itself nor precedent res 
judic由ta.
Chou defected from his group an:! requested for asylum. The 
reason for such request was ,chiefly if not solely, ideological oppre'8ion. 
Such a case is no doubt political in nature in our age In an ar!Icle 
very rare of the kind, giving a“general”defimtion to the term 
“political refugee", Balogh says・“（politicalrefugees are) people 
who have left their country of origm or domicile because of politi田l
or rehg10us events.叫叫 Religionbelongs to the sphere of ideology. 
And, bemg a poht1cal refogee requesting for political asylum, Chou’s 
psychological condit10n was the most import四tthing to be considered. 
On “Re:ugee’s MentalityヘBalogncontmues“.. he (the political 
refugee) looks back upon his previous hfe四 dlongs to return to it as 
the obvious solution to al his difficulties. This longing to re如rn,this 
hope that he may be able to go back to his homeland, is a funda-
mental element in the refugee situation and can be termed the basis 
of refugee-mentality. But what hope of returmng has the politi田 l
refugee ? His return depends on a complete reversal of policy m his 
home-country .. A reversal of pohcy could probably be effected only 
by a revolution . But he 、N"ouldhkely not have gone out into ex!le 
(14〕 E.Balogh，“World Peace and The Refuge. Problem，” in Recuetl de> 
Cours, L’A ca de回目 deDrott International de la Haye, vol. 75 (1949 I), p. 
373 Brackete mine. 
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if he had not considered submission worse than exile .. """ 
It is beyond reasonable doubt that when Chou defected into the 
Soviet Embassy in Tokyo, he had determined to take al nsks, 
including those which might fal on his family left behind in Red 
China. He had made a decision, firm enough Such decision could be 
al柁red,in ordmary case, by Red Chma’s change m policy or idea・ 
logy. But there was no change in Red China’s policy or ideology, as 
there had not been revolution or coup d’Hat leading to such con・ 
>•quence. And due to the rea田n that it is only the ch四 geof will, 
done freely by the pnhtical refugee himself, that shall be considered 
in田seof reasonably determining a political asylum case, the only 
presumption for Chou’s changing his wills would be that he did田
accordmg to his own free will. But, in the context of “refugee 
mentality”， how could this be done? There must have been田me-
thmg psychologically more powerful to overturn his decision of request-
ing for politi田 1asylum. What could be this “somethmg”？ Perhaps 
his worriness about what might happen to his wife and children in 
Red Chma. But, again, had he not decided to let his family take 
the risks? If so, why did he make such contradictory wills? Here it 
is only conceivable that 田mepressure was made on him, and 
objective facts tel that leftists pressed on him for change of will. 
Under such circumstances, if世usC皿 becalled “changm呂、， infreelyヘ
it can only be a 'forced’“free will”And a‘forced’“free wll’＇， except 
in Rousseau’S specific sense, is, m al other cases, not a“free”will 
at al. 
We therefore conclude that, reasonably, the disposal of the Chou 
Case must follow his“original will”. In result, Japan acted mistak-
enly in reccgnizing the efiect of Chou’s“fmal will”， whatever it was. 
〔2〕Whetherthere existed an international juridical norm on“poli-
ti回lasylum”in general? 
It is very unfortunate that at the present stage of mternational 
(15) Ibid , p. 389-390. Brackets added 
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law the rules田lgen町alpolitical fugitive are by no means clear.旧〉
Whether to grant or not to grant asylum to a political refugee 1s, as 
a rule, fer the State, which is requ田tedshelter, to decide. This 
means that 1t 1s the requested State, and not 世田 pohticalrefugee 
or another State acting on his behalf as a r田ultof 却plicationof law, 
that has a right of or a claim to asylum."" 
But there 1s another side of the picture There exists a special 
situa!Jon in China, and there are special juridical relations between 
Japan and the Republic of China regulated by the Peace Treaty of 
1952. These facts make the Chou Case somethmg sui generis，国ld
to旧chthe question as to how 1t was pcssible that the Republic of 
Chma had the right to require that Chou, who came from R臼d
China, be sent to Taiwan, even if Chou’s wnt担nintention to go there 
be taken as his “original will”世1eeffect of which was not recognized 
At the moment Chou stepped on Japanese soil, according to 
internat10nal law Japan’s terntorial iunsdiction took precedence ov町
the relation, factual for Japan, between Chou and Red China."" 
And since Japan did not, and do白 not,recognize Red China de jure 
or de fact冶， itwould be hard for J ap四 toadmit Red China’s claim 
of perrnnal iurisd1ct10n over Chou when Chou was on Japanese f町、
ritcry. In law Red China could not田 claim,not at least toward 
States not recognizing it "" What remained, then, as the only tie 
(16) See, Oda，“lntecnattonal Legislation on Protection of Refug田 S勺 in
”Jur恒t",No, 282, Sep七ember15, 1963, pp. 41-6. 
ο7) Cppenheim, Internatrnnal Law, Vol. I, 8th ed., 1961, pp 677-678. 
(18〕 As a matter of cou四e,this must be differentiated from the回目 of
pe四onaljurisdiction de jure and ab initio. 
Cf. Oppenheim, ibid, p, 676, Monaco, Manmle di Diritto lnternazionale 
P 1bblico, 1960, p. 302-3; Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens 
Abroad, 1922, Preface and § 14. 
(19) There is there品目 differencebetween this田seand similar cas由。c町 red
cef o問 inthe United Kingdom and in Sweden, etc., had such S旬testake立
m担suressimilar to tho'e which were taken by Japan in the pr，唱団t田.se.
However, they returned the Red Chinese defec加問 to the Republic of 
China with which they main祖medno diplomatic relations The Chou Case 
is, in 出issen,e, umque and impoctant for the future, and h田cethe 
attitude of the Republic of China on this case is quite unders恒ndable
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between Chou and Red China was Chou’s“sense of allegiance" or 
obedience which, in this case, became subjective on Chou’s part《＇＂＇
Correspondingly，田町onas Chou signed the paper, to the effect 
that he would go to the Republic of China, which signified that 
he 、.vouldnot go back to Red China, his S田biectivefactual link of 
allegiance toward，田ldobedience to, Red Chma was cut off. In such 
a situation, the Republic of China, being a State recJgnized by Japan, 
would have a right to claim that it had personal juns:!ictcion over 
Chou, as a result of Chou’s free choice Such jurisdiction may be 
doubted, as it is cJnstructive m nature ; nevertheless, it must be 
remembered that al p町田naljurisdictions over cil!zens abroad are 
constructive or rather, f1ctit1ous m nature －～de iure Jurisヨict1onin 
<:ontradistinction to actual bodily control."" This directly relates the 
mncept of“e任ectivecontrol" which has been deemed the decisive point 
m the “China Problem" and, particularly, in the Peace Treaty between 
Japan and the Republic of China of 1952. It also signifies that Chinese 
people not under actual control by Red Chma on the mainland and唱a
fortiori, twenty million overseas Chinese, are, in law, under the 
jurisdiction of the Republic of China, on the cond1t10ns that this 
applies to those who obey it and that the States on whose t町n-
tones such Chmese peJple reside or stay, recognize the Republic 
〔加） See Laski, A Grammar of Politi田， 4thed. (14th Imprふ 1960,pp. 21, 
250; Max Weber, Die Typen der Herrschaft, in“Wirtschaft und Gesell-
schaft, 1925, Dritter Tei!, Kap I, Kap. l1I 
{21) By the same token, it is clear that, so far as the“nationality”of 
Chinese abroad is concerned, the Repuolic of China is of right to claim 
diploπmtlc protection, if such Chmese declares his wil to this efect. It 
must not be overlooked that the Japane記 Governmenttreats Chinese 
from Hongkong as belonging to the Republic of China, to the bene:it or 
for the cnnvemence of Japan. Japan ts thus estopped m this respect Cf. 
Borchard, op. cit., § 4; Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 1952, p. 
2岨 f.;Verdross, Volke"Cecht, 1950, Kap X, (D), IV; Macher, The Web 
of Government, 11th Printing, 1953, Chs. il-5, Ch. 13. The Smo-Japanese 
Peace Tr田 tyof 1952 and Exchange of Notes attached thereto, m問gard
to“effectivity” of the Republtc of China over China Mainland and 
the people there, are, accordmgly, irrelevant here. 
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of Ch ma de Jure. This 1s the true reason why the Republic of China 
reacted so furiously in th回目se.If this is so, then 1t would appear 
that the Republic of Chma had a nght, while Japan was und町 an
obligation, both in the juridical sense, to have Chou gone to Taiwan. 
Here we have the M田 ofwhat may be termed“split of the concept 
of effectiv1ty"; namely, even if the control of Chma Mainland 
(territory and ~eople) by Red Chma be admitted, a State that 
recognizes the Republic of China 、mllstil have to respond to the 
claim by the Republic of China of her personal iunsd1ct10n, with the 
口onsentsof the persons in question, over Chmese not on Chma Main-
I叩 d,including those who left Chma Mainland for a moment but 
who have declared to submit themselves七othe Republic of Chma-
From another叩 gle,at the moment when Chou stepped into the 
Soviet Embassy m Tokyo and requested for political asylum, that 
1s to say, as soon as he refused to return to Red China, lus mtention 
and act made it completely clear that ipso facto he no more obeyed 
Red Chma. Such obedience, once demed, can be recoveぞedonly 
when Chou actu2ily ste~s into Red China anew and under actual 
control by Red Chma〔factualterritorial Jurisdiction over Chou). This 
1s so for Japan which does not recognrze Red Chma. The situation 
being such, Chou had as from that moment lost any protection, even 
factual protectirn. Under this cir口1mstance,1t is legal, and in fact 
humane, that some State-Japan or the R叩ubhcof China-must 
protect him, if the ~oviet Embassy had refused him asylum. And 
if Japan did not do so or did not want to do so, al would be left 
to the Republic of China. 
But it may be argued that perhapちChou’s“origmal will" was not 
to go to the Republic of China, but to stay in Japan, after he had 
been refused asylum by the fo・;iet Embassy. That 1s, as soon as Chou 
was dehvered to the Jaranese police authorities, his "original will”， 
namely, the will to stay in !:oviet Russia町 1.sembassy, became void 
and his se:ond will, the will he expressed m the Japanese Immigration 
Office later, to the e任ectthat he would stay m Jap四， tookthe place 
268 
of the “ongmal will”J叫
To the above argument, the田 sweris this : the above norm 1s not the 
only one cone町nmgthis case , under international law, there 1s another 
norm, of the same category, m another shape，国dperhaps the true 
shape which has not been paid attention to by both the Japanese 
and the Republic of Chinese governments, nor by any article on this 
case. This 1s the norm on“polit1cal crimmal”， to which we now turn. 
(3) Whether there was an mternat10nal Juridical norm regulating 
the Chou Case in particular. If so, what would be the results? 
If the above Juridical logic on the Chou Case as one of political 
refugee (or fugitive) requ田tingfor asylum, holds good, automatic酒Uy
it applies to the case of a“political criminal" and, in Chou’s case, to 
his request to stay in J ap四， thoughnot necessarily to go to the 
Republic of China. 
According to general mternational law, a political crimmal〔or
political offender〕，託 identified,is non-extraditable.'"' Accordingly, 
廿iepoints here町e:whether Chou could be classified as a“pohtical 
cnmmalヘandwhat would be the results if this point 1s answered 
in the affirmative. 
Apohti回 lcriminal, in四 asylumcase, differs from an ordinary politi-
・Cal refugee, m that he is a“pohtI回lrefugee+comm1tted some political 
・crime against his home State”.Hypothetically, if Chou was a poht1cal 
.cr1mmal, th凹 Japanwould have international juridical obligation in 
{22〕 See,Edo. op. cit., p.76, Here a contrary but seemingly true fact 
reported by papers, that Chou went to Soviet Embassy only by mistake, 
is stil a senous point to be considered Fact-fmding m 曲目白血 1s,
therefore, very consequential. But the qu曲目onas to which fact is true 
fact, unfortunately, remams m the circle of“Riddle", as the“A田hi
Weekly”called 1t. 
く23〕Thisis a universal principle, see Briggs, the Law of Nations, Cases, 
Do cu田町tsand Not田，1938,p, 315 ; Scott and Jaeger, Cases on International 
Law, 1937, pp. 392-8, and notes 4, 45 and 49 on following pag田，
Oppenheim, op cit. pp. 707 and 710. See further, de lege ferenda, 
Harvard Research, Draft Convention on“ExtraditionヘArticle5〔in
A,meri田nJournal of International Law, 1935), and the Resolution by the 
Institut de Droit International (1950〕．
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the disp田1honof the case. Such obligation would exist, on the in-
ternational plane、towardthe Republic of China」ifthe latter had 
personal jurisdiction over Chou and du匂rto give Chou diplomatic 
protection In that case, according to mternational law Japan could 
not be free from s 10h obligation, with the only defense that, unlike 
the laws of m四Y口oun仕its(e.g, constitution of Fr阻 ce四 dof 
West German Republic), m her laws there 1s no such thing called 
匂oliticalcriminal”（as in fact this is the case under postwar 
Japanese laws〕. This四回， 1fwe re四 lt主atJapan recognizes the 
governm四tof the Republic of China which was und町 aduty toward 
Chou，四dhad a 均httoward Japan in regard to Chou, for his 
diplomatic protection.＇叫 Und町 thishypothesis, Japan, having paid no 
heed加 Chou'sclai血edspecial status as expressed in his original 
will and the act of defect10n, instead sent him to Red China accor-
dmg to his final will made under pressure, was in breach of the 
obligat10n of non-extradition which，令awardthe Republic of China, 
took the form of obligation to answer to the la仕町、requestconcerning 
diplomatic protect10n in Chou’s behalf If, as havmg been remaでked,
Japan had the right to decide whether or not to grant asylum to 
Chou, and if she decided not to so grant, she should have delivered 
Chou to the Republic of China, or other coun仕1esif Chou wished. 
That there v時四回 intention〔notto return to Red China but 
rath町 tor問 U田tfor asylum）皿d血 act(defection) leaves no doubt 
in the Chou Case. It stands to r曲目nthat for Chou to be a political 
cnmmal, either his act of defection, or his intentionむorefuse白
return，四国tbe criminal in nature But to what should such criminal 
nature be referred' Since Japan has no四chthmg called “political 
crime" in law, it must be referred to Red China's laws. Such laws, 
おrJapan which recogn1z白 theRepublic of Chma, the nval in the 
civil war aimed at maintainmg legitimacy as against Red China, 
remam pure fact and nothing more th皿 fact.附 Nσw,mRed Chi問、
〔24) Balogh, l.c; Borchard, op.cit, Preface and § 15. 
(25〕Thisis not to be confused with the田sewhere a court of a State, in 
deciding a case befo田 it,applies a law, or follows a court decrnion, of 
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special criminal law( e g. anti-Revolut10nary Regulations, etc ), Chou’s 
act of defection per se was a crime subject to very severe punishment 
(including capital punishment), disregarding his intention and/ or 
motive behind it帥＇ Such crime, though juridical, is, doubtlessly, also 
“poht!cal”from v1ewi;omt of the legislative motive glV!Ug birth to 
such regulations as a whole, and of the common nature of the 
crimes mentioned in that regulations. Chou was therefore a 
“political”“cnmmal”， pure担 dSimple. 
In this respect, warnmg must follow immediately that a political 
refugee is not necessarily and always a political criminal. There are 
a lot of precedents, especially in Latm American countries where 
coup d’etat IS something a ]amode, even act of requestmg foreign 
embassy for political asylum (extrater口tonalasylum) is not, under 
domestic laws, a crime at al. It must be further stressed世田tthere 
are even many treaties to such effect αηIn Chou’s case, he became 
a political refugee and a pohtical criminal simultaneously. It would 
be impossible for him to commit some vMble crim曲， politi田Iin 
nature, on Chma Mamland (e g., 1o a田assinateMao T悼ーtung,etc 〕
while he happened to be on Japanese soil, so as加 convincethe 
Japanese Government that he was a tyi;ical pohtical criminal ；田d
indeed it would be agamst reason to reqmre of him the committal 
of such an offense as substantial proof of his qualificat10n. 
From the above, it seems that the Republic of Chma had a right 
another State. In such由民 suchlaw or precedent, being foreign, is 
always treated as“pure fact'’． 
26) It should be added that even the“mtent”to defect is, in Red China, 
punishable politically, through secret police without due proce田 oflaw. 
This is why public opinion in the Republic of China termed Japan’s deter-
mination to send Chou back to Red China ”act of皿urder".The fact 
that after returning to Red China Chou was not pumshed, 1s a result of 
political consideration Such fact, in discussing pure legal points, is 1ト
relevant Furthermore, since the punishment of“intent”is, m Red China, 
independent of change of intent〔mChou’s case,change of will m favor 
of Red China), it is hard to be sure that Chou will never be punished, 
in some special form, by the secret police。np。liticalgrounds and 0占or
his "first wil'’， 
(27〕Oda,m“Jur’st”， No. 281, cited m infra note 34. 
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at least to ask that Chou not be sent to Red China 
Naturally, in defense of her position, Japan also has something to 
say. She may contend that a man like Chou, who changed will from 
time to time, was not qualified to be treated as political cnmmal. 
This is true, but not good defense; for, this is b田idethe pmnt. The 
pmnt is : Chou’s personal status in Red China being irrelevant (let alone 
the problem of“will”）， Japan had to examme, and after such examma-
tton to give determmation, and to inform the Republic of Chma, as to 
whether Chou’s defection was political and/or cr1mmal m nature, with 
full reasons given Though it appears that it、11ouldbe very difficult 
for Japan to hold the negative, a line must be drawn, as a matter 
of law, between whether Japan did examine this pmnt，田dwhether 
her determmations were rea sοnable and her measures, appropriate. 
In the latter case, it is a matter of degree, and there could exist 
a dispute between the parties on the concept of polit1cal refugee or 
political criminal and on the correctness m cogmz祖国 offacts; m 
the former回 se,the maction on the part of Japan infringed the 
personal sovereignty of the Republic of China and is a matter of 
juridical pnnciple Jap日， abinitio, had not even had the intention 
to conSider whether Chou’s defection was pohtt回 Iand/or criminal 
m nature Such inaction .alone entails i包 mternationalr田ponsibility.
Whether Chou was or wa' not politic al cnmmal m fact，民社iere-
fore, no effective basis of argument for ex口lSe.
IV. Policy Trends of世田 Republicof China and of Japan in 
the Chou Case 
Though the iurid1cal s1tuat10ns are clear, this article is not one 
restncted to discuss10ns of iundical 1田ues, nor are we interested 
solely in the pros and cons of juridical logic. After al, the above 
Juridical situations 、,verenot ser10usly considered 1n the Chou Case. 
However, they are important for knowing the policy仕endsof the 
two countries in the Chou Case which brought about吐lew町 ststate 
of a百airs1n the post 
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our predictions This C皿 bedone, through inference from the 
background and a comparison of the Juridical situations with the 
actual stands taken by the parties. 
The background and the juridical situations stated m Sections I 
and II respectively being kept in mind, it is evident that the true 
issue in the Chou Case was not at al the Chou Case itself, so f町
as the foreign policy trends of the two countries are concerned. The 
true i田ueis : under the impact of the then scheduled French recogni-
t10n of Red Chma, both co回 tneshad their diffic 1!ties at that time 
and ambitions for future. That is to田y,the Chou Case was a screen, 
behmd which the real actors were fighting for something else 
(1) Japan 
(A) Di節cultiesJapan’s difficulties were, and remain, chiefly dome-
stic. Far more serious than in oth町 States, every issue of foreign 
affairs is simultaneously and automatically a domestic political 
issue for Prime Mmister Ikeda The progre田iveforce〔chieflythe 
Socialist Party) and the rival groups mside the ruling Liberal-
Democratic Party will lose no ch皿ceto make ful use of this 
Japanese political trait, which comes from the fact that m a metaph-
oric sense也ereare two Japans (split in public opmion), two 
gov町nments(labour and student organizatio国田dthe Government), 
担 dgovernments behmd the Government 〔fact10nswithin the ruling 
Party). 
Confronted by such s仕ongchallenges, it is a matter of course that 
世田 Governmentside should avoid pnliti回 lyundesirable happenings 
to the utmost extent. This determined the Government attitude m 
the Chou Case.α＂Th町eis no supra party basis for Japan’s foreign 
policy. 
くB)Ambillons But if there were difficulties, th町ewere also ambi-
ti9ns on the part of the. Ikeda Cabinet. 
Basing on post-w町 Japaneserealism田 don the vision of a Great 
Japan, the Ikeda Cabinet, like al post-war田binets, is struggling 
(28〕Thereaders are referred to Section I above, on background of the曲目．
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-for its“mdependent”diplomacy, as the Conlon Report correctly 
-points out The Ikeda Cabinet, smce its succession to the former 
Kishi Cabinet, has stressed from time to time that Japan is a Great 
・Power, meaning that she rs the leader m Asia and equal partner of 
USA, under the guide of the principle of“primacy of the United 
Nations”. This is the fundamental lme which Pnme Minister Ikeda 
:has m mmd on foreign affairs It is a reflection of the natronal 
volition and a result of the eveトchangmgpost-war mternational 
。environment.It is perhaps the raison d'etre of every post-war 
cabinet. 
What will be the evolved form of 他国 foreignpohcy line is, m 
Prime Mmister Ikeda’s mmd, a“co existence" scene, with economic 
development, and even econo頂icsurvival, as its target, and with the 
absence of political pressures as support in a passive sense. 
But such “co・existence”foreign policy line presupposes more trade, 
and more other sorts of int町course, with Red Chma m the first 
-place This rs destined to cause troubles between Japan and the 
Repubhc of China. And, smce the Ikeda Cabinet, for the hme bemg 
perhaps, will not, or rather cannot, get too close to Red Chma without 
・consrdenng the v町y existence of the Repubhc of Chma, its policy 
trends on al issues related to the “Chma Problem" lose direction, 
.and sometimes seem to be nopolicy at all."" This rs a dilemma, 
a somewhat fatal dilemma Such dilemma did not mean too much旬
the past cabinets which stood firm, that is, firm in maintaining 
fnendly relations with the Republic of Chma at the cost of Red Chma. 
However, in the case of Ikeda Cabinet’s“co-existence”diplomacy, 
.as the name suggests, the dilemma stands on the bnnk of explosion 
If this is correct, th四 asa matter of pohtical survival Prime Minister 
1keda should sohe or仕yto solve rt. It is therefore possible that, 
at least in出elat町 stage of the Chou Case，刷＇he立国deuse of it 
(29) This was cnticized by many a Japanese observers and public op1mon 
at large during the Chou Case as well as before and after it 。〕 Itis clear that the Cabin吐 touchedthe回目 onlyat the later s同ge
where legalism dominated However, under the law regulatmg the matter 
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to test the possrbihty for his future “forward attitude" towards Red'. 
Chma, and the maximum reactrons from the Republic of Chma on_ 
this point. If in fact he did so, then he did so partly for the sake・ 
of appeasing the opposition forces, within田 dout of hrs Party. It 
1s evident, m any event，也athe is desirous of tradmg with Red 
China, especially when France seems to have got the chance in 
advance of Japan. No matter how much he was successful and 1s to 
be successful in世間 establishment of his “unrque” ~olicy, and to・ 
whatever extent might he think about such trade, there is no doubt・ 
that he did not want something simihr to the Nagasaki Flag Accident 
of 1958 to occur.'"' He could not afford to have it repeated, as . 
obJective circumstances w1廿unJapan did not allow such repetition 
with the domestic political status quo kept unchanged 
(2) Republic of China 
CA〕Difficulties-Thedifficulties of the Republic of China, on the-
other hand, were mainly international. The Chou Case not only was 
linked to 1白 fundamentalpolicy of liberating the people on China 
Mamland, but also touched it• 1nternatronal status, w1thm and 
without the United Nations, at a time when France was gomg to・
menace i包 survivalthrough recognition of Red China. In result, 
her reactions against Japan had two implications at least: First, 
through attackmg Japan, indirectly requestmg France to re consider・ 
the recognition schedule if there was stil room for such 
re consideration ; and secondly, to w町 nJapan that though she might: 
not be able to stop Fr皿ce企o:nacting, she had arms to stop Japan 
fro:n doing the same thing (including large scale trade with Red: 
there was stil room for politi田Iinterference, and even control, by the 
Cabinet, in favour of the Republic of China 
(31) Jn that case the Republic of Chma protested, and the Kishi Cabmet" 
taking a firm stand, determmed in her favour As a result, Red China. 
declared interruption of al trad田 withJapan, and aroused attacks agamst: 
the K1sh1 Cabinet For facts and cnti田， v.“InternationalYear Book”，a 
vol. I, 1958 (published by “Nihon Kokusa• Mondai Kenkyuio" -Japan. 
International Problems Res坦rchInstitute〕， p.141. f., p. 155 f. 
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<China which is bound to lead to the situation of“two Chinas＇’ 
-through fait accompli）臼，
(B〕Ambitions-Thereactions of the Republic of China in the回se
were, therefore, tantamount to preventive diplomatic self-defense in 
the broad sense, less for the Chou Case than for the future, hence 
more for fear than for angry. This was a hard fight a chance it 
crnust take for any price. 
In connection with the above, 1t is probable that the Republic of 
・Chma made use of the chance, in a negative manner, to stop Red 
China’s influence m Japan and, m consequence, to des位oyal pas-
sibilities for Japan to get closer to Red China, in the event where 
Chou was delivere:l to her. In such case, she would be in a netter 
・position, as a result of a diplomatic victory over Red China, in the 
matter of her leg1t1macy in the s回目 wemade clear in Section II. 
Such hypothetical effeots pr田upposethe consequential situation 
・similar句 thatof the Nagasaki Flag Accident refe町edto in the 
above. The same arms brought for her a victory in the K1sh1 Cabinet 
period, but a defeat in the present case. She overlooke:l, p町 haps
・intentionally disregarded, the diff，町encesbetween the two cabinets 
m their leaderships as well as in the social backgrounds of Japan 
generally. Lack of variability in choosmg diplomatic arms adapting 
・to changeable situations, was one of the fatal defects on the part 
心fthe Republic of China. 
Thus, mistake m this diplomatic war agamst Japan made the 
Republic of China suffer a defeat In oth百 words,it was fully aware 
・Of the juridical situations we discussed m Section II＇向 butreacted 
wrongly In consequence it deprived itself of the juridically favourable 
{32) This is "to kil two birds with a single stone”， and is also one of the 
mostly used tactics m traditional Chinese politics，回目ed"killing the 
chicken so as to teach the monkeyぺ
く33) N回 rlyal ofcial oral prot田tsand statements by the government of, 
and many of the editorials on newspape四 in,the Republic of China 
pain匝d,unconsciously, to the centre of the jundical situations we discussed, 
in terms, however, of anything except positive internat10nal law 
i16 
pos1t1on. It knew what to do, but ignoreヨhowto do. 
First of al, the Republic of China, though it had a juridica[ 
right about the Chou Case as shown in Section II above, nevertheless 
gave it up unlmowmgly, by usmg other arms m attacking J apau. 
From begmnmg to end, 1t ins1steヨthatthis was au international 
juridical case. This 1s so far correct However, the basis on which 
it put its clmm was morality，皿dnot int•古田.ttonal law proper. 
This not only deprived its assertions of convincing force but, cor・ 
resi:ondingly, also gave Japan the chauce to apply domestic law 
to the case without any hardness in law. 
In alleging “international law 〔ofhumanity)", the Repubhc of 
China resorted, inter aUa, to the I:eolaration of Universal Humau 
Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
(1948〕， andthe “mtemational usage”carne:I out by the Umted 
Kingdom and Sweoen, etc. above referred It is conceivable that 1t 
had also in .mmd m田 Y甘eat<eson the mat恒rsigne :lamong mauy 
coun甘iesaf町 theSecond World War.削 Itis further thinkable that 
甘wasaskmg J ap皿 tocarry out !he !att•町、廿adittonal i:olitical 
principle of giving special consideration to Chmese political fugiti・ 
ves附 Butal these are either not law but pohttcal expeヨiency,or 
though law but law not for Japan and the Republic of Chma inter 
se. "" Under the circumstances, with moral obligations put aside-
for the moment, the Repubhc of Chma having playe:l、iVTongcards, 
there is no surprise that it was taken off diplomatic mitiative at 
(34) Oda, "International Treaties concerning Refug自 Sぺin“Jurist",No 285, 
November 1, 1963, p. 32-6, and“L唱alSystems r哩ardingrrotection of 
Political Fugitivesヘinibid , No. 281, September 1, 1963 
(35) This g配sback as far as the pre-Kuomintang period, where Japan ga間
shelters to Chmese revolutionists against the Chmg Dynasty, nearly without 
exception By so doing, in Dr. Sun Yat Sen’s idea, Japan became the beet 
of China’s revolutionary movements. Thereafter Japan has carried out this 
practi田 consistently,thus gives such practice the nature of a principle 
or trad社ion,in the eyes of the Chinese. 
(36) Neither the Republic of Chma nor Japan has signed such kind of treaty炉
hence no problem of nght and obligation arises 
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the beginnmg，血dlost the case at the end. She was reported to 
have prepareヨ旬 submitthis ca田 tothe International Court of 
Justice If she does, she is destined to lose a law-war. 
Secondly, and what is more potential, is the fact that there existed 
something uncompromising, bet七erqualified“direct crush”， between 
the two countries. 
In simple terms, from past experiences m the s仕uggleagainst 
Communism the Republic of China asser白 thatthere is only one 
way，四dno other ways, left for anti-Commumst movemen匂， namely,
force agamst force, else compromise to surrender. From such extreme 
and monistic anti-Commumsm thesis, m i匝 eyeit follows that as 
阻 anti-Commun,!Stcountry belongmg to the Free World Japan should 
not contact with Red China and, smce Japan has no army, what she 
can offer is only economic blockade : not to trade with Red China. 
However, on the part of Japan, the what may be called “relative and 
dualistic anti・Commumsmthesis" is adop同d;to wit, it is not nece田－
anly the severance of al relations with Red Chma that is the only 
way of anti-Communist movement From this the Ikeda Cabmet could 
田ythat trade with Red China is exactly one of the Japanese style of 
anti Commumst contribution・Japanis facing invisible but continuous 
economic cns田， andonly such trade can solve such crises ; if such 
trade be impossible, Japan would fal mto domestic economic and 
political, and may be also social, turmoil, it, therefore, conforms 
to logic that, m order that Japan may stand agamst Communism, 
the pr・ereqmsite is to let her develop her national economy so as 
to stop political仕oublesmade by leftist force in Japan. Here lies a 
di丘町encein the means toward the same end-anti-Communism. 
But this is exactly what the Republic of Chma oppo田s.For the 
purpose of convmcing Japan, it makes three points clear. (l)that Japan 
should not ignore that吐ieRepublic of China and other AS!an anti-
Commumst countries are fighting at the front-hne agamst Red China, 
which fact is the sine qua non for Jap血’ssurvival and prosperity ; 
(2〕thatJapan should not forget that after the war President 
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Chiang Kat・shek saved two milhon Japanese soldiers and ClVl!ians on 
mainland from Communist cruel r町田野町田.d(3) that Japan should 
rememb町 thatthe 芦田entpr由P町ityof Jap叩 comesfrom Pr田1dent
Chiang’s deci•ion of rejecting the sugg田tionmade by USSR imme-
.diately af七町世田 war,th.at Japan be made the Second Berlm. None・ 
theless, the reality in Japan 1s: (1) not much people believe in 
the strategy of “the Island Chain＇’，hence the Republic of China’s 
military contribution to Japan, indirect but p町田nount,is not widely 
appreciated ; '"' (2〕theyoung gen町ation, which comp旧sesof the 
ma1ority of Japan田eVO怯同 payingless attention to morality, does 
not, as the old generat10n does, understand the significance of the 
gen町田ityshown by President Chiang 18 y田rsago-even among the 
old generation, many think that Japan’s signing of the Peace Treaty 
in 1952, when the Republic of China re甘田.tedto Taiw担， was田 me
kind of repayment for such generosity ; and (3〕theJapanese p田＞pie
has no solid悼田eof the pains su任町e.dby a spht country. The 
case being田， itgoes without saying that the above warnings 
made by the Republic of China do not sound convincmg to the 
Japanese people m general. 
× x × 
From the above, a general picture of policy仕endsmay be drawn 
(37) More parti叩larly,while the Republic of China is m a state of civil 
war, post-war Jap日 hdominated by the utopia of permanent univer'Ol 
p師団.Accordingly, the military contributions by the former, in the eyes 
of a considerable portion of Japan"' people, perhaps including also m皿y
leaders m al circles (≪en goV'rnm叩 tHoads), are, curious enough, 
undoretood as hindr回目白 Japan’sprosperity and m四 aceto intern-
ational p回目.In出泊予egard,it may be helpful to ci恒 apublic opinion 
poll made aおwmonths ago, with the result that les than half of the 
Japanese出 nkthat J却anshould問団inm the Free World. This, of 
C四国e,does not回国nthat they a目 pro-Cammunis恒.Su曲目sultis四 tber
natural from post-w町 Japanesepsychology with 出emost 1mpor回nt
problem of national safety solved by USA milttary force, they get into 
so由ekind of p8ace-maod inertia. Lack of experi阻むein facing Communist 
direct aggressions, most Japan°'e see Communist threats as s。mething
U町田l.
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The policy trend of the Republic of China m this case was domin-
ated by morality. Fit包geraldis right in pomting out that as四国i・
festat1on of one of the important national character, the Chmese is 
apt加 mixmorality with law."" But such charact百 hasas its basis 
the tendency to confuse the ideal with the real, which, at the 
present stage, is coloured by mihtary motive.'"' 
By con甘ast,in the Chou Case Japan base:l her actions on legal 
formalism, with economic motive behmd; that is, with a vision of 
enlarging scale of trade with Red Chma, actively or passively on the 
part of the Cabinet-economic realism.帥＇Such was the pohcy trend of 
Japan shown in her diplomatic war agamst the Republic of Chma, made 
clear in official statements and publications, equally innumerable "". 
Thus, the Chou Case加okthe shai:e of direct colliston in policy 
trends : the military and idealistic vs. the economic国idrealistic. 
From this ipso facto appeared the conflict that, where田 Japantook 
Chou Case as one ad hoc, the Republic of Chma, a matter of 
prmciple. The two were once more parallel. This ts the m。stsigni一
五cantpoint which led to al unfortunate results And it ts correct, 
イ38) C.P. Fitzgerald，“Revoluton in Chinaヘ1952,Ch One 
く39) Too much evid阻曲目n be given in this regard. During the Chou 
Case, al editonals of the newspape四凹blishedin, and al ofi口als回te・
ments issued by, the Republic of China drew one to come to such con-
clusion_ Even verbal protes恒ロtade by her agamst Japan were no exceptions. 
For important reference>: Report on an exclusive mterview of the Foreign 
Mmister of the Republic of Chma by Mamichi Shimbun correspondent 
(the Matmchi Shimbun, January 3, 1964), Comments on Ono’S visit to 
Taipei (the A田htShimbun, January 8, 1964) , Official Statement made 
on December 28, 1963, prot田tingJapan’s provisionally releasing Chou 
and decision to issue Leave Port "Permission. Statement madεon January 
10, 1964, protesting Japan’s returning Chou to Red China. 
( 40) Cf. C. Martin Wilbur, in H. Borton et alt四，“Japanbetwe四 Ea.stand 
West，＇’ 1957, Ch. Fwe, p. 239, and W. J Jorden, in ibid , Ch Six, p 265 
Especially, s担 C.Yanaga，“Japanese People and Politicsヘ1956,p. 45. 
(41) Government Statement to the Republic of China, mad• on December 
30, 1963, asking for understanding on Japan’s disposition of the Chou 
Case ; Prime Mimster Ikeda’s New Year Greeting to the people and inter-
views, cited >upra m note 9. 
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when many Japanese criticizers blamed their Government for 1匝
ignoring the real meanings of the Chou Case, because there nught 
be no troubles 1f it studied this case deeper. 
Be that as 1t may, such collision and parall恰lattitudes are the 
by-products of the d旺町encesbetween the two countries, m their 
respective social s土ructures,>oht1cal ideas and systems, >olitical and 
eαonom1c situations, views on military s仕ategy皿 dnational safety 
as a whole, and on law and politics，血deven difference in the 
“degree”or quantity of anti-Communist ideology, national charac怯rs
and mも：ernationalenvircn町田1ts.
But 1f the Republic of China lost the case, neither did Japan won 
one. 
On the one hand, the Republic of Chma lo坑 thecase, but abs土amed 
from usmg her ultimate diplomatic arms-formal severance of relat-
inns, due, witおDeGaulle Typhoon in mind, to the ra士innalpolitical 
considerat旧田 t泊 tif she pushed柏oh町 d, J却組問ghtbe forced 
todom町 em favour of Red China Here she learnt that such ultimate 
diplomatic町田s1s not always effective and practical, and that for 
her it may even be dangerous She wiU no doubt in the ne訂釦加re
change her haid-a枕itude加＇wardJapan. 
On the other hand, J ap四， thoughshe, with the unexpected help 
from the impact of the De Gaulle Typhoon on the Republic of 
China, was saved from a very d伍cultand undesirable sitュation,as 
con企antingthe Republic of China and USA, did hurt her own moral 
prestige in the Fr田 World,and to some extend repealed mter-
national trustworthiness She won the ca昭和rthe moment ; but she 
lost a m町alwar in the long run. Eurth町more,paradoxically speak-
ing, the sending of Chou to Red China would be used by domestic 
opposition forc白血田mekind of political estoppel agains土 I国da
Cabinet's retr田 tin future, so far as its policy toward Red Chma is 
concerned. In such case, Ja申anwill be met with more furio旧S
reactrnns, and this time react1伺 sm new sty le.“幻 TheRepublic of 
(42〕 Seeinfra Section V. 
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Chma will not lose another law war. 
Here, to conclude this Section, we may say that in the Chou Case唱
while Japan had a "no-pohcy”甘endof foreign policy toward the 
Republic of Chma, in the sense that she had no fir皿 standingnor 
agreed“primary national interest”， the Republic of Chma, a“non-
pohcy”甘endof foreign policy toward Japan, m the sense that she 
could not use prop町 ar皿sto fight at the proper timing in the 
diplomatic sph町ewhich is only another name for “reaceful battlefield＇”． 
The two, the“no”and the “nonヘcomi;ound, and we may have a 
foreign policy in the proper sense of the term In other words, Japan 
had也cticswithout strategy, whereas the Republic of China had 
stra1egy without tactics. Poor brothers I 
But through the painful exi;eriences in this由民 both Go,ern-
ments are made nee国saryto prepare re considering their policies 
vis・a-vrs each oth町．
On the i:art of Japan, daily reports of interi:ellat1ons m the Diet 
show that the Ikeda Cabmet’s“Chma Pohcy”is stil in a nebulous 
condrtron, due to the existence of the Peace Treaty bet問団 Japan
and the Reρublrc of Chma. 
On the part of the Republic of China, its line rs to some extent 
cl田r.It discovers that, had it claimed Chou with strong rea田ns
backed by law, Japanese public opimon would have changed rts vrew 
to a great ext田tand hence, the Ikeda Cabinet might not have deter-
mmed the Chou Case m the way it actually did It wrll, in future, 
use moral force as diplomatic shield，田idJaw as diplomatic halbers.＇叫
Here lies the source of the problems hiding under Ikeda Cabinet’s 
“China Policy”visιvis the Republic of China. 
(43) For proof, see different wordmgs m the Official Statement made on 
January 27, 1964 by the Repubhc of Chma to F四nee,protestmg French 
recognition of Red Chma ; editorials, artlcl田（someby the present wnter), 
and news reports pubhshed on Chinese papers in Taiwan and Hongkong 
after the Chou Case and before/ after French回cognitionof Red China, 
warning to this efect, 
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V. Problems Lurking in Ikeda Cabinet’s“＇China Policy”vis-
a-vis世田 Republicof China 
We now come to the sphere of pred1ction-s~eculative problems 
inferred from the ~ohcy trends we found out in the previous Section. 
Under the impact of French recogmt1on of Red China＇＂》， opmion
in Japan urging the Japanese Governnent to re-make its“China Policy" 
・becomes strong町 ands位。nger.This has become the target question 
・of interpellations m Diet, and it seems difficult for the Ikeda Cabmet 
to resist for long without some new arms 
On the F訂 tof the Republic of China, re口nsiderat1on of her 
勺apnPolicy”also becom田 inevitable, m the context of domestic 
-0pm10n and international politics，山 includingher future m the UN. 
The impact of French recogmt1on on Japan is chiefly this: that 
de Gaulle fought a way out for the realization of a certain form 
-Of“twoChma”theory."" However, the result seems most likely to 
be in the negative. 
( 44) For impact of French rocognition of Red China, more important materials 
in Japane'e language are 
(Fehruarγ9, 1964), pp 12-17, pp.18-25 (Special Edition on“F阻 n由、
Recognition of Red Chn祖”）；‘＇TheEcanom>St'', February 4 issue, 1964, pp 
6-14, pp 16-18; the ’＇World WeeklyヘFetruary11 issue, 1964, pp 7-10, 
14-19, 20・30.s田 espe口allyIrie，“Junsprudence on Recognition of Com-
munist Chine'e Government", in "A1日h1Journalぺvol.6,No 5 (February 
3, 1964〕， pp 20-25 The last is a very good article, though in part too 
subjective and not nec"sarily one of“Junspruden田．”
(45〕 Especially,she also faces pressure from USA, in terms of the “open-door” 
policy trend made known in speeches by high officials of US State 
Dei:artment like Hitsman recently, which has its derivation m the speech 
by the late President Kennedy made immediately before his sudden death. 
(46) On 
Ch mas’，’ 1962, especially pp. 1-61 178-186, and pp. 187-208; Kondo，“The 
Destiny of Taiwanヘ1961,especially PP-114-151；”JiJ1tsusbin-sba”（Cur-
rent Affair< Press〕ed，“Pekmg-Taiwan-TbeUnited Nationsヘ1961,PP-
17 et seq, p 97 f., p. 109 ff ,p. 141 ff, p.199 f. For important foreign 
hte回 ture,see, Dean, m Pro田edings, Ameri但 nSociety of International 
Law, 1955; R. Carreau, in •Politique Et回ngere, 1959, pp 67-82, S. K 
Hornbeck，“Which Chinese？”， in Foreign Affairs, 1955-6, pp. 24-39 ; P .B. 
Potter, in Ameri田nJournal of International Law, 1956, Ed Comments, 
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There are町田nya problems involved in the “two China" theory in 
any form.'"' To save space, we need only to point out the m町its
of the “two・Chma”1de≫ 
So far as the present writer knows, solutions suggested by writers. 
and politici皿sin USA, the United Kingcon, Canada, Italy G町
many, Fr訂正e,India, Japan, Australia, Austria, and in Spain, for 
the pr田ent“ChmaProble:n”， can be counted加 twelvem number, 
r却 gingfrom “two China”〔m many forms〕，“One-and-Half-China”？
“Special One and-Half-Chinaヘto“NoChina" and “Three China" the-
ones. Under the circums匂nces,perhaps in theory a“multi-Chma’p 
theory (in the event where Re:! China splits mto two or three〕，
and a“New Chinas”th田町（皿曲目ngthat pending legitimacy for 
future proof, neither the Republic of China nor Red China is to 
claim identity with“The Republic of China" of the pre civil war 
period），＇＂》 arealso conceivable 
It takes a thick book to discuss the above solutions of.町ed.For 
O町 purposessu節目 it柏 sayhere that, to ask the question目“one
China or two Chinas ? and how戸田 totrouble oneself There is no 
scholarly answer to such a question, because the question itself do.,; 
not exist on such plane , if it exists at al, 1t 1s certamly open也
al 町1swers.It 1s an 1deological rnsue connecting with one's view on 
the future world. 
Polit1cally, such question田nlead to no practical solution. Both 
the Republic of China and Red China are op~osed to it, for it 
pp 417 et seq.; Q Wright m ibid., 1950, pp. 548-59, and in ibid 1955, 
pp. 320-338. 
( 47) For instance, UN Chinese Represep回tion (or Red China’s admission), 
legal status of Taiwan, etc. See, e g., G Ar阻 g10-Rmz，“LaQuestione 
Cinese”， in“Scritto d1 D1ritto Internazionale m onore d1 T. Perassi, vol. 
1 ',pp 67 et sq, Karl Zemanek，“Die volkerrechthche Stellung Formosas", 
in Archiv des Vo!kerrechts, Bel 5, 1955, S S. 309 319 ; Nathan F＇町nberg,
“L’Admission de Nouveaux Membres a La Sode語 desNations et a L’ 
Organization des Ns Umes”， in Recue1! des Cours, op cit , J.952 (!), pp. 
297 et seq. 
( 48) There are too many publi田tionsand articles on such theories. The 
readers田nfmd out b1bhog四phiesfrom the materials cited in note 46. 
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七ouches仕ieirvital int自主S恒 m common: that Taiwan belongs to 
Chma and that the Chmeseαvii War has not come 句 an田 d.
These are commons聞記 oftoday, and find their con町吐eおrmin the 
recent Fre泊chrecogmt1凹lof Red China“幻 Nosolution, not even 
one based on ideology, is practicable, becauseall solut10ns o庄町己d 
.are politically u目id白 ira削e
The剖t岨t旧nbe in耳so,th刊eIkeda Cabine士’ confrontedby domestl c 
・opposition forces and P町tof public opimon pr田smga“po回t1ve”
attitude m i白“ChinaPolicy", is戸Jtin a very aweful and agonizing 
posit on."" It becomes sliced chicken between two pieces of bread. The 
"Socialist Party md oth町 leftwing force from the outside, and 
the Pro-Red-China Lobby (Ishibashi and other factions) within the 
ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, push Prime Mm1ster Ikeda 白
establish a ne川“ChinaPolicy", which takes as i白pomtof departure 
recognition of Red China. But a considerable part of pubhc opinion 
with its supp町t町samong the people, and the Pro-Republic of-
China Lobby in the ruling party (party elder Yoshida, and Qnn, 
Kishi, Ishii and other factions占whichalone is able to目前田cethe 
I同daCabinet to a political d国士：h,warn Ikeda to remain at the post. 
Besides these, internationally, the Republic of Ch ma is ready to do 
{49) s匝ternentby the Republic of China回 F四n田 madeon Jan田町 27,
196ιprotestmg the latter’s recogniton of Red China (The田mewas also 
notified to the Japanese Gov町田nent); Red Chma’s Statement made on 
January 28, 1964; also, People’s Daily, January 29, 1964. 
{50〕Juridically,such solutions a四 equallyimpossible For our purpo日， the
pamt expr田sedin the text is su田cient加 b<eakdown any at民mptin this 
問gard.For reasonings of such juridical impos'>bility and for refer町 res,
S時 myarticles in the “Tien-Sha (The Universe〕Maga,ine”， HangKong, 
Nos. 69 and 70, De曲目ber1962 and January 1963 ; in “The Ov町seas
Chinese Lifeぺ刊12,No.3, March 1963 ; and “The Function of the Concept 
of’Peace’in the International order" (excerption of Spam’S Orue Plaza 
Pri盟問問ヴ， 1961-62),in A回 1田 dela Universidad de Valenc•a, Spain, 
1964. Cf. J. R. de Orue，乱在anualde Derecho In七四国cionalPublica, Madrid, 
1933, S. 246. V. also Jose de Yanguas Messia. Belig町田daNo lntervencion 
Y Reconoロmento, Umv. de Salama紅白， 1938,p. 33 f. p.84 f. 
〈日） See ”Asahi Journalヘvol.6,No. 7, Febrnary 16, 1964, pp. 12“25. It is 
inte問stingto s田 thateven within the Socialist Party, there exists split 
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what 1t can i:ossibly do; USA w紅白 Japannot to do anything on 
the problem, at le注目 fora certain period to come , 出 dRed China 
is domg al it c皿 mJapan to pre田 hardon Ikeヨa,through left wing 
force in Japan 
There is another issue, peculiar to Japan’s bureaucracy Prime 
Mmister Ikeda, himself no doubt anti-Commumst and standing m 
a、veof the results of French recogmtion of Red China, overtly declines 
to take act10n for the moment, but 1s desirous of recov町田Efriendly 
relations with the Republic of Chma instead ; whereas the Mimstry 
・Of International Trade and Industry tends to enlarge scale of甘ade
with Red China on the b田isof deferred payments which will 
1nev1tably agitate the Republic of Chma, and within the Minis廿yof 
Foreign Affairs the “two China" th剖 ry,which has had potential force 
,;ince 1952-53, 1s gaining weight. Though foreign policy is according to 
law basically determmed by the Prime Mmister and the Minist町 of
Foreign Affairs, both of these two present mimsters are laymen to 
foreign policy and，甘aditionally,the Jap曲目ebureaucrats田 agroup, 
with support from pre田uregroups, has its own existence and mflu-
剖 tialforce which can not be comp'U"ed with its counterp町 tsmother 
.countries This adds one more headache issue for the Ikeda Cabinet 
.as a whole and for Ikeda as the Prime Minister 
Carrymg the above on the back, what Prime Mimst町 Ikedacan 
・say at pr缶四tis that“the ‘China Problem ’1s a wor Id problem七O
be r国olvedin the Umted Nations”， " that “policy toward Red China 
will be one in line with reality皿 dneeお highprudence，… while 
maintaining friendly relations with the Republic of China ”。＂All 
these repeat his dilemma. Under such dilemma, again, he> his inde 
pendent“co-existence ”foreign policy line.“In connexion with the 
independence of Japan’s diplomacy, my policy line 阻： tobe trusteヨ
on the problem Such split is, like m the case of the ruling party, 
closely connected with inter-factional struggle for power. 
く52〕 Ikeda’sAdmmistratlve Address on January 21, 1964 Foreign Minister 
Ohira has repeated these pomts for times. 
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by the Free Cam p田idto be respected by the Communist Camp”．《叫
This, 1f it is not a mghtmare, c田iat the most be named an “ideal” 
for a policy line, never the policy line itself. 
Thus, at least for the time be:ng Ikeda Cabinet’s“China Policy ” 
remains m the same cond1t1on described by the New York Times as 
making the world sleepy '"' 
But what else c四 hedo ? Nothing at the pr白 ent.Why ? Because 
on pnme M1mster Ikeda’s back there are two other issues, and fatal 
issues, hidmg in his own heart, half-oonsc10us but not yet concrete 
for him. Th白eare the “war reparation ”problem田 dthe “Peace 
Treaty" quest10n. "" These l田uesare special, and a四 whatwe mean 
by“Problems ”appearing m the title of the present article 
Of these “problems ”the situation is this 回 longas Japan mam-
tains friendly relations 、'liththe Republic of Chma、引thoutgomg 
too close to Red China, no trouble ar1s白.On the other hand，出回on
as the Ikeda Cabmet pushes one step forward to Red China at廿ie
町中enseof the Republic of China, a series of s町iousevents might fol-
low as conseq uences the destructive effect of the Peace Treaty with 
the Republic of China, and the veto nature of President Chiang’s 
former promise加 giveup“war indemnity”from Japan. Pnme Minis-
ter Ikeda, in his reply to皿 interpellationin the Diet，田1don January 
31加 theeffect that“Red Chma has no right旬 askfor war reparation 
from Japan, as Japan fought with the Republic of China, and not with 
Red China ”.This indirectly touch田 partof the issues, though not 
of the foreseeable results behmd them The very existence of the 
Republic of Chma, which 1s the sine qua non of the Peace Treaty 
of 1952, beco田町 Japan’ssafety-volve against Red Chma’S possible 
diplomatic attack 1 
(53) Prime Minister Ikeda’s News Conference on January 18, 1964. 
〔54) New York Times, Special Edition on”New Japan”ー
(55〕Somehave begun to be conscious of the issues but have not fully 
caught the senous results behind them, s担， forinstance, Takeuchi's 
article in “Sekai",op. cit., p.50百.See further, Foreigu Minister Oh1田 in
“The Economistヘop.dt, p. 17. 
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These 沼田国， onthe other hand, become the most pow町釦Iarms 
of the Republic of Chma in its future diplomatic war agamst Ja-
pan. In her relations with Japan, she asks for “al or nothing ”．
And in case she be clear that there may be “m世iing”， shewill 
naturally choose these juridical arms at the proper timing to defend 
her own出 istence,seemg that, the world situation havmg changed 
as a result of the De Gaulle Typhoon, Japan’s attitude, paracoxically, 
tendsむodominate US attitude，田 faras the “Chma Problem”is 
conc町ned.In this event, again paradoxically enough, such Juridical 
arms, namely, revocat10n of the promise, made at the time of conclu-
ding the Peace Treaty of 1952, of abandoning war reparation, and 
the abolition of the Peace Treaty itself, protect the Ikeda Cabinet, 
in the sense that Ikeda Cabinet can mal田 useof them as shield in: 
r白1stmgattacks from opposition force inside Japan. 
Up to this stage, we must remmd that this article is written under 
the guide of Max Web町、 profo田idtruth quoted at the beginning 
of this article: we are to point out problems, with田lutionskept 
intact 
The manner of resortmg to these arms by the Republic of China' 
would, in concreto, be this・(1)in the event Japan gets too close 
to Red China, or re:ogmz白 RedChma de facto, then promise of 
abandomng war reraraton could be revokeヨ；阻d〔2〕mthe event 
Ikeda Cabmet is going to re:ogmze“two Chmasヘin田町 form,or 
to recogmze Red China at the exclus10n of the Republic of China. 
the Peace Treaty could be declared void before such recognition. 
Both of th白etwo arms are Juridically possible，＜同 intera!ia, under 
(56〕 Oppenhaim,op cit., p. 943; and vol. I, 7 th ed. 1952, pp. 615-6. 
Cf. Le Fur, Precis de Dro1t International Public, 1937, s 445, 990, 993. 
(57) Quadri, Diritto In匝rnazionalePubblico, II ed. 1960, p.165. Such arms 
may be exercised under the UN Charter, under principles of g町時四l
international law on repnsal vs. br且 chof tr田町， underthe pnnciple of 
Rebus sic stantibus, etc. But to avoid the restriction of the Charter and 
the ambiguities existing in al other pnnc1ples, the Republic of China 
would no doubt choose as basis what is here suggested. 
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simple jurisprudence that, considering the background of the making 
of the Peace Treaty, such promise was ma年 un'.!eran implied re田ー
lutive condition,'"' naγnely that Japan should not recogmze Red 
China ；皿dthat the Peace Treaty was made un~er an exrr田 S
suspensive condition concerning China Mainland (Exchan明 ofNotes 
attached to the Peace Treaty of 1952), namely that before the Re-
public of Chma returns to the Mainland, the Peace Treaty is not one 
cοvering the Mainland. 
Here doubt may be cast on whether the Republic of China will 
exercise such arms m the ways suggested, because such exercise would 
brmg destructive effects not only to Japan but also to the Republic 
of China. In reply, we refer those who so doubt to past facts: (1) 
immed1a也：lyafter USSR had recngmzed Red Chma on Octob町 2,
1949, the Republic of Chma, though knowing that nothmg could be 
done in the matter, nevertheless declared void the Sino-Soviet Treaty 
of Alliance and Friendship (1945) ; (2) President Chiang’s furious 
attitude in reacting against Japanese actions at Lookauchao (July 7, 
1937) which led to the Sino Japanese war.向＇ While in Japan “ShinJU 
(double smc1deγ’1s typical way of realizing love when hope less，“mutual 
des甘uctionぺfarfrom romantic, is the traditional way of Chinese 
political settlement when dead-or-alive qm白t10n1s at stake And m 
the above hypotheses about what Japan might do in future, leg1t1 
macy"" and survival are clearly at stake ! It may be added that, 
if m the n回rfuture the Republic of Chma severs relations with 
Fr皿 ce,as there seems to be no alternative, there will be anoth町
田 amplein our support. The probable use of this double blade sword 
in future diplomatic war is, evidently, nothing “believe or not” 
The plain truth 1s always subject to forgetfuln田s.Some may again 
argue the practical e任ectsof the exercise of such訂 msby the Repub-
(58) Togawa，叩. cit, p 160. It is helpful to remmd that at that time 
al believed that, pending US assistance which w回目therimprobable, 
China could possibly resist only for a few months. 
(59) Fitzgerald, 1. c 
Problems Lurking jn Ikeda Cabinet’s 289 
lie of China. Our answer is . such argument implies the und町一esti-
mation of the juridical e狂ects叩 dpohtical implications of the ex-
1sten:e or non-existence of a pea:e treaty, which is a very special 
kind of treaty under mternational law. As soon as the Repubhc of 
•Chma revokes the promise of abandonmg war indemnity, Red China 
:has as a matt町 oflaw a right to claim same；皿d師団onas the 
Peace Treaty of 1952 1s denounced, Japan has )und1cal obligation to 
:make one with Red China anew H町・e, curiously agam, the vital 
mter田tsof the Repubhc of China and Red China 町ein concert, 
・though m different 盟国白・ Besides,the dem皿ciat1onof the Peace 
Treaty of 1952 before Japan demes to the Repubhc of Chma its 
pr田町tiur1dical status facing Japan, might, in law, cause the problem 
・Of r回国npt1onof the state of war as between the two conn甘ies
Such state of war, being a resumption of the stale of affairs of the 
former Sino-Japanese War, will exclude the application of the UN 
・Charter which prohibits threat of force Cs也teof war, though 
formal and techmcal, 1s w1thm this category〕．
One may further contend that, on the oth官 hand,Red Chma will 
・not actually ask Japan to sign a Peace Tr田.ty皿 dclaim war repara-
・t1on, m view of the fact that the “state of war”between Japan and 
USSR was ended without any peaceむ田.tyor war reparation at al. 
But it is notむobe forgotten that whereas USSR has got much from 
Japan, though it did not suffer anything from Japan during the 
Second World War ；刷＇Red China has got nothing田 far, though 
the Chmese people, in oon仕adistinctionto Red Chinese regime it担lf,
suffered much. One must not be too optimistic about Red China's 
attitude toward Japan on these points. Red China has nothing to love 
of present Japan; what it might love would be a communized Japan 
・only.Especially when, under the above hypothesis, Japan would 
:recognize Red China, with the background of the Peace Tr担 .tyof 
>(60) In case of Germany, we draw the readers' attention to the fact that USSR, 
albeit suffered much from Germany during the war, has got more than 
half of Hitler's Great Germany, plus a trump cud in the Berlin situation. 
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1952 being denounced, Re1 China would be totally free to, ancl 
benifitted by, demanding what it w田itsfrom Japan.《＂＇ In such case, 
Red China would po盟国seffective diplomatic arms par excellence. 
All these, untold before, are hardly bearable by any res]Oonsible 
Japanese stat田町田n, irr白•Pective of their ideologies and however 
realistic they be, as such d白tructiveeffects may shake Japan’S 
public opimon and the Japanese people at large. This 1s the most: 
important reality Even Japan had her de Gaulle anヨ another・
Monsieur E. Faure whose reasonings on the田lutionof the “Chm a.
Problem”in“Figaro”are far from convincing，阻deven if Red 
China were admitted mto the UN under whatever form, Japan is. 
not free to do what she wan匂
Consequently, no matter what vision the Ikeda Cabinet may posse盟 p
1恒 announced forei且n i:olicy line, esrecially the prmciple of 
“primacy of UN" which underlies other principles, 1s，田 fara• the・ 
“China Problem" 1s concerned, not applicable. Japn must wait for 
changes, and gr朗 tchanges, inside and/or outside China 
Post Scriptum 
Foreign policy trends of two countries vis-a-vis each oilier appear 
most cle訂lyin time of dispute between them, hence predictions 
C担 bemade easier witll more d句田dability.Judged object1vely, the・ 
reactions of the Republic of China against Japan in the Chou Case・ 
appear to be too radical and the ex己cuhonof their contents beyond. 
capability, and hence r田ultnothmg but the undesirable They 
give the chance to Jap四， •nd a gap to be印刷 m by Red China,. 
(61〕 Whatevertheory of聞cognition(constitutive or declaratory theory〕one・
may adopt, it remains true that recognition is in the立国inbila匝国I.
French recognition of Red China is the best example at hand. As long 
as Japan has diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, Red China, 
due to nece'5ity田das tactics, shows a somewhat soft attitude toward 
Japan on the two田町田nowunder discussion. Otherwise, the四sewill be-
totally different. The Socialist Pary，、•hen 1t asked the Cabmet to de-
noun曲 thePeace Treaty with the Republic of China, was perhaps igno日nt:
of such difference, putting aside the fact that such denunciation by Japan, 
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咽nmore non pohtical mtercourse between the two entit1田， This,
however, has a]reョdybeen shown by the aftermath of the Nagasaki 
Incident In conseョuence,the Republic of China will have to admit 
・such reality of mfercourse m 血ture, though reluctantly and 
gradually, as the tide m Japan pomts to such direct10n. At this 
・moment, any other Japan田ecabmet would have to do lhe same, 
and perhaps worse than the Ikeda Cadmet, so far as the Republic 
of China is cone町ned.The Repubhc of China knows this well, but only 
仕i田 toresist for the回 keof “considerat10n”in return, for “faceぺ
・Or otherwise. 
The purpose of this article 1s to promotefnendly relations between 
Jaran and the Republic of China at the present stage田 faras 
possible, by warning irresponsible leaders m the Japanese so:ial 
circles who urge for ~rompt recogmt1on of Red China, through 
:makmg apparent the dangers lying under the problems pointed out 
in this specific study which brid伊sa gap in the r朗自rch of 
:Sino Japan白erelations. 
From present state of affairs it must be reahzed that Japan 
stands or falls with the Republic of Chma. They are mseparable 
parts of the defense line of the Free World in the Far East. 
What would be the future anヨhowfar the Ikeda Cabinet c田1
・stan i firm against the pre詰ureanヨinduce羽田1tof gettmg closer to 
:Red China, are hard to predict But we have a serious, tho・1gh spe・ 
culat1ve, s1tuat’on at sight, unfavourable to Jacan’s future. The 
・destiny of Japan is in the hands of the Japanese people the:nselves, 
・to be determmed through w1sdo:n of their leaders. 
There is no doubt that by田 dl町gethe Japanese F田 pleare in f担 r
-of Rei China which to them is stil unknown. Accordingly, the Ikeda 
•Cabmet's “ Chma Pohcy”will, in the foreseeable future, remam 
m the main unchanged. The most what it will do and c宙1do IS 
“i:ositive accumulating fOr.n of trade" under the doubtful principle 
would be tantamount to declaring another war. as against the Republic 
of Chma. 
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of“severance of the economic from the rolitical ". This might be 
said句 haveI白basison some kin:! of national i:ride for independence・ 
in foreign a丘airs,in the last re叩rt,it is also the catagorical 
imi:erative for Japan’s survival. However, if it阻むuethat without 
甘adeJai:an田 anisland country can not live, it 1s equally true・ 
that facing the wadd!mg attitude of Japan, as a country threatened 
with survival the Republic of Chma can not tut be highly nervous. 
It should be remmded that, under the sui:rerre order of corrmon. 
destiny, unity is required. The basic question for the future relati-
ons of the•e two count口esis, therefore, not only to rnamtain but 
also to s・仕engthentheir friendly tie. As a precondit旧nto this, they 
must甘yto 田町eunderstand each other. 
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